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ABSTRACT
Much of the policy discussion of labor market institutions has been at the margin, with
proposals to tighten unemployment benefits, reduce employment protection, and so on. There has
been little discussion however of what the ultimate goal and architecture should be. The paper
focuses on characterizing this ultimate goal, the optimal architecture of labor market institutions.
We start our analysis with a simple benchmark, with risk averse workers, risk neutral firms
and random shocks to productivity. In this benchmark, we show that optimality requires both
unemployment insurance and employment protection---in the form of layoff taxes; it also requires
that layoff taxes be equal to unemployment benefits.
We then explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations: limits on insurance,
limits on layoff taxes, ex-post wage bargaining, and heterogeneity of firms or workers. We show
how the architecture must be modified in each case. The scope for insurance may be more limited
than in the benchmark; so may the scope for employment protection. The general principle remains
however, namely the need to look at unemployment insurance and employment protection together,













Unemployment insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied
in isolation. In this paper, we argue that they are tightly linked, and we focus on their
optimal joint design.
We start our analysis in Section 1 with a simple benchmark. Workers are risk averse;
entrepreneurs run ¯rms and are risk neutral. The productivity of any worker-¯rm match
is random. If productivity is low enough, the worker and the ¯rm may separate, in which
case the worker becomes unemployed.
In this benchmark, a simple way to achieve the optimum is for the state to pay un-
employment bene¯ts so as to insure workers, and to levy layo® taxes so as to lead ¯rms
to internalize the cost of unemployment and take an e±cient layo® decision. Thus, the
benchmark shows the tight conceptual relation between unemployment insurance and em-
ployment protection|de¯ned as layo® taxes.
The optimum has two further characteristics: The ¯rst is that layo® taxes are equal
to unemployment bene¯ts: This common level delivers both full insurance and production
e±ciency. The second, which follows from the ¯rst, is that state intervention is not needed.
The same allocation is achieved by having ¯rms voluntarily pay severance payments to
their workers; in e®ect, severance payments act both as unemployment insurance and
layo® taxes.
This leads us to examine, in Sections 2 to 5, how these conclusions are a®ected by the
introduction of four empirically-relevant deviations from the benchmark, from limits on
unemployment insurance, to limits on the ability of ¯rms to pay layo® taxes, to ex{post
wage bargaining, and to ex{ante heterogeneity of either workers or ¯rms. In each case,
we ask two questions: The ¯rst is how the distortion a®ects the optimal combination of
unemployment insurance and layo® taxes. The second is whether state intervention is
required.
We ¯nd that, in general, e±ciency and insurance require di®erent levels of layo® taxes
and unemployment bene¯ts, with the di®erence being ¯nanced through payroll taxes |
positive or negative.
The fact that layo® taxes are in general not equal to unemployment bene¯ts also implies
that individual ¯rms can no longer implement the optimum on their own (i.e. through sev-
erance payments). A pooling or insurance agency is needed to receive payments both from
¯rms which lay workers o® and from ¯rms that do not, and to distribute unemployment
2bene¯ts to laid o® workers. We show that, in some cases, this role can be ¯lled by a private
agency, with voluntary participation by ¯rms, but that in others, participation must be
compulsory, implying a clear role for the state. We also show, in Section 6, that, while, in
some cases, insurance can be provided through a combination of severance payments by
¯rms and unemployment bene¯ts by the agency, in other cases, the agency must require
exclusivity in the provision of insurance, lest the outcome be suboptimal.
Before we start, we want to emphasize the limits of our analysis. Our framework
is a static, one-period, model. As such, it represents a substantial step back from recent
dynamic models of either unemployment insurance or employment protection. We do so for
two reasons. First, we want to focus on the joint design of unemployment insurance and
employment protection, which makes things more di±cult. Second, we want to explore
a large number of labor market imperfections, starting from as simple a benchmark as
feasible. We believe that the conclusions we draw from our model, about the articulation
of unemployment insurance and employment protection, about the relative use of layo®
and payroll taxes in response to various market imperfections, and about the role of the
state, are quite general and can help design better systems. In that context, we draw, in
Section 7, what we see as our main conclusions and our intended extensions.
1 A benchmark
1.1 Assumptions
Tastes and technology are as follows:
² The economy is composed of a continuum of mass 1 of workers, a continuum of mass (at
least) 1 of entrepreneurs, and the state.
² Entrepreneurs are risk neutral. Each entrepreneur can start and run a ¯rm. There is a
¯xed cost of creating a ¯rm, I, which is the same for all entrepreneurs.
If a ¯rm is created, a worker is hired, and the productivity of the match is then revealed.
Productivity is given by y from cdf G(y), with density g(y) on [0;1]. The ¯rm can either
keep the worker and produce, or lay the worker o®, who then becomes unemployed.
Realizations are iid across ¯rms; there is no aggregate risk.
² The ¯rm, but not the worker (or for that matter third parties such as an insurance
3company or the state) observes y.1
² Workers are risk averse, with utility function U(:). Absent unemployment bene¯ts, utility
if unemployed is given by U(b) (so b is the wage equivalent of being unemployed).
1.2 The optimal allocation
Let ¹ y be the threshold level of productivity below which workers are laid o®. Let w be the
payment to the workers who remain employed, and ¹ be the payment to the workers who
are laid o®.




VW ´ G(¹ y)U(b + ¹) + (1 ¡ G(¹ y))U(w)
subject to:
V ´ ¡G(¹ y)¹ +
Z 1
¹ y
y dG(y) ¡ (1 ¡ G(¹ y))w = I
From the ¯rst{order conditions, it follows that:
w¤ = b + ¹¤ (1)
¹ y¤ = b (2)
Given ¹ y¤, the levels of w¤ and ¹¤ are determined by the resource constraint.
Condition (1) is an insurance condition: Workers achieve the same level of utility,
whether employed or laid-o® and unemployed.
Condition (2) is an e±ciency condition: From the point of view of total output, it is
e±cient for ¯rms to produce so long as productivity exceeds the wage equivalent of being
unemployed (we shall call b the production-e±cient threshold level).
1This assumption is maintained throughout the paper, except in Section 4 which introduces ex-post
bargaining, and in which both the worker and the ¯rm observe the realization of y.
2We derive the optimal allocation ignoring the assumption that y is observed only by the ¯rm. We shall
show below that this optimal allocation can indeed be implemented.
41.3 Implementation
Any provision of insurance by the ¯rm (a severance payment) can be duplicated by the
state through unemployment bene¯ts in this economy. At best, severance payments are
redundant; in some circumstances (those envisioned in Section 2), we shall see that they
must actually be ruled out in order to implement the optimal allocation. So, until we discuss
alternative implementation schemes in Section 6, we assume away severance payments.
Consider now the following implementation of the optimal benchmark allocation:
² Stage 1. The state chooses a payroll tax rate ¿, a layo® tax rate f, and unemployment
bene¯ts ¹.
² Stage 2. Entrepreneurs decide whether to start ¯rms and pay the ¯xed cost.
They o®er contracts to workers. Contracts are characterized, explicitly, by a wage w,
and, implicitly (since y is not contractable), a threshold productivity level ¹ y below which
the worker is laid o®.
As all ¯rms face the same cost and distribution of productivity, in equilibrium, all
workers are initially hired.
² Stage 3. The productivity of each job is realized. Firms decide whether to keep or dismiss
workers.
To show how the optimal allocation can be implemented, we work backwards in time.
At Stage 3, the cuto® ¹ y is such that the ¯rm is indi®erent between keeping the worker
and paying w +¿ in wage and payroll tax and dismissing the worker and paying layo® tax
f:
¹ y = w + ¿ ¡ f: (3)
If y > ¹ y, the ¯rm keeps the worker, produces y, pays w to the worker, and ¿ to the
state. If y < ¹ y, the ¯rm lays the worker o®, pays f to the state; the state pays ¹ to the
worker.
At Stage 2, ¯rms' wage o®er w satis¯es the free entry condition:
VF ´ ¡G(¹ y)f +
Z 1
¹ y
y dG(y) ¡ (1 ¡ G(¹ y))(w + ¿) = I: (4)
5Consider now the problem faced by the government in choosing taxes and unemploy-
ment bene¯ts at Stage 1. Condition (3) implies that to induce ¯rms to take the production-
e±cient layo® decision ¹ y¤ = b, the following condition must hold:
w + ¿ ¡ f = b: (5)
Because optimal insurance further requires that w = b+¹, the state's policy must satisfy:
f ¡ ¿ = ¹: (6)
The net ¯scal cost to the ¯rm of laying o® a worker must be equal to the unemployment
bene¯ts paid to the worker by the state. Note that this condition implies a positive relation
between the layo® and the payroll tax rates: For given unemployment bene¯ts, the higher
the payroll tax, the higher the layo® tax needed to induce the ¯rm to take the production-
e±cient decision.
The government budget constraint implies a second relation between taxes and bene¯ts:
VG ´ ¡G(¹ y)(¹ ¡ f) + (1 ¡ G(¹ y))¿ = 0 (7)
This constraint implies a negative relation between the layo® and the payroll tax rates:
For given unemployment bene¯ts, the higher the payroll tax, the lower the layo® tax
required to balance the budget. Combining the two conditions gives:
f = ¹; ¿ = 0 (8)
The layo® tax must be equal to unemployment bene¯ts, and the payroll tax rate is equal
to zero. The payment of layo® taxes equal to unemployment bene¯ts makes ¯rms fully
internalize the cost of insurance provided by the state to the unemployed.
We summarize our results in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. In the benchmark, the optimal allocation is such that workers are fully
insured (b + ¹¤ = w¤), and the threshold productivity is equal to the wage equivalent of
being unemployed (¹ y¤ = b).
6Implementation is achieved through unemployment bene¯ts equal to ¹¤, and layo®
taxes f = ¹¤. Payroll taxes are equal to zero. Put another way, the contribution rate,
de¯ned as the ratio of layo® taxes to unemployment bene¯ts, is equal to one.
2 Limits on Insurance
In our benchmark, workers could be and were fully insured. In practice, there are various
reasons why this may not be feasible. Workers may require incentives not to shirk when
employed, or to search when unemployed. Or there may be a non{pecuniary loss associated
with becoming unemployed. We explore the implications of this last assumption, and return
to a discussion of other potential reasons later.
Assume that the utility of workers is now given by U(c) if employed, and by U(c) ¡ B
if unemployed, so B > 0 is the utility cost of being unemployed. All other assumptions are
the same as in the benchmark.
2.1 The optimal allocation
The optimal allocation is the solution to:3
max
fw;¹;¹ yg
VW ´ G(¹ y)(U(b + ¹) ¡ B) + (1 ¡ G(¹ y))U(w);
subject to the resource constraint:
V ´ ¡G(¹ y)¹ +
Z 1
¹ y
y dG(y) ¡ (1 ¡ G(¹ y))w = I:
From the ¯rst{order conditions, it follows that:
w¤ = b + ¹¤: (9)




Given ¹ y¤, the levels of w¤ and ¹¤ are determined by condition that the resource constraint
holds with equality.
3In deriving the optimal allocation, we again ignore the constraint that y is only observed by the ¯rm.
Again, we show below that this allocation can be implemented.
7Condition (9) shows that marginal utility is equalized across employment and unem-
ployment. Because B > 0 however, this implies that utility is lower when unemployed.
Condition (10) shows that the threshold level of productivity, ¹ y¤, is lower than the
production-e±cient level b.4
2.2 Implementation
Assume, as before, that the state ¯rst chooses taxes and bene¯ts, the ¯rms then enter and
o®er a wage to workers, and, ¯nally, productivity is realized. To describe how the optimal
allocation is implemented, we again work backwards in time.5
At Stage 3, the threshold productivity below which the ¯rm lays a worker o® is still
given by:
¹ y = w + ¿ ¡ f: (3)
At Stage 2, the wage must satisfy the free entry condition:
VF ´ ¡G(¹ y)f +
Z 1
¹ y
y dG(y) ¡ (1 ¡ G(¹ y))(w + ¿) = I:
Consider thus the problem faced by the government in choosing taxes and unemploy-
ment bene¯ts at Stage 1. From equations (3) and (10), it follows that, to induce ¯rms to
take the socially-optimal layo® decision ¹ y¤ = b ¡ B=U0(w), the following condition must
hold:




The net ¯scal cost to the ¯rm of laying o® a worker must exceed the unemployment bene¯ts
paid to the worker by an amount which depends on the cost of becoming unemployed.
The other condition on taxes and bene¯ts comes from the government budget con-
straint:
¡G(¹ y)(¹ ¡ f) + (1 ¡ G(¹ y))¿ = 0:
4This overemployment result should be familiar from the \implicit contract literature" (in particular
Baily (1974), Azariadis (1975), Akerlof and Miyazaki (1980)): The lower layo® rate serves as a partial
substitute for unemployment insurance.
5We continue to assume that severance payments are equal to zero. In this case, the assumption is not
innocuous: Allowing for both unemployment bene¯ts and severance payments would lead to a co-insurance
problem and a suboptimal allocation. We discuss the issue in Section 6.
8Combining these two conditions gives:
f = ¹ +
B
U0(w)
; ¿ < 0 (11)
The layo® tax must exceed unemployment bene¯ts, implying, for budget balance, a negative
payroll tax.
We summarize our results in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. (i) In the presence of limits to insurance, the threshold productivity in the
socially e±cient allocation is lower than the wage equivalent of being unemployed (¹ y¤ < b):
The lower incidence of unemployment partly compensates for the limits on insurance when
unemployed.
(ii) Unemployment bene¯ts, ¹, must be ¯nanced by a combination of layo® taxes which
exceed these bene¯ts (f > ¹) and of negative payroll taxes, (¿ < 0). Put another way, the
contribution rate must now be greater than one.
2.3 Implications and discussion
² The main result in Proposition 2 is that, in the presence of limits to insurance, layo®
taxes must exceed unemployment bene¯ts | the contribution rate must be greater than
one. The higher the utility cost of unemployment, the lower the layo® rate, the larger the
layo® taxes.
This implies that, with respect to variations in B, unemployment insurance and em-
ployment protection are therefore substitutes: The lower the feasible level of insurance, the
higher the implied level of employment protection. Higher employment protection however
is a poor substitute for insurance, as it leads to distortions in the layo® decision. Thus,
unemployment insurance reforms which reduce B (we shall give an example below, when
interpreting B as a result of the need for search incentives) have both favorable direct
(better insurance) and indirect (lower layo® taxes and lower distortions) e®ects.
² The second result is that payments by ¯rms in case of layo®s must be larger than payments
to the laid{o® workers. This obviously could not be achieved by severance payments, which
imply equal payments by ¯rms and payments to workers, and requires the presence of a
third party.6 We have taken this third party to be the state, collecting layo® taxes and
6This is an example of the general proposition (for example HolmstrÄ om (1982)) that, when both incen-
9(negative) payroll taxes, and paying unemployment bene¯ts to workers. Formally, what
is needed is a pooling or insurance agency, collecting payments from ¯rms that layo®,
paying unemployment bene¯ts to workers, and distributing the di®erence to the remaining
¯rms. In this case, ¯rms who join are better o®. The agency may therefore be private and
participation voluntary.
² We formalized limits to insurance as coming from a non-¯nancial cost of being unem-
ployed. The limits may come instead from incentives.
Consider for example a modi¯cation of the benchmark based on shirking. Once hired,
but before productivity is revealed, the worker decides whether to shirk or not. Shirking
brings private bene¯ts B but results in zero productivity and thus a layo®. Shirking is
unobservable. Thus, to prevent shirking, the following condition must hold:
(1 ¡ G(¹ y))(U(w) ¡ U(b + ¹)) ¸ B: (12)
The expected utility gain from being employed relative to being unemployed must exceed
some value B. The characterization of the optimum and the implementation are then
identical to those above, except for the replacement of B=U0(w) by (1 ¡ G(¹ y))B=U0(w) in
the relevant equations.7
An alternative rationalization comes from the need to motivate the unemployed to
search. While we cannot formally analyze this case in our one-period model, search incen-
tive constraints are likely to lead however to results similar to those we have derived. The
di®erence in utility between unemployment and employment has to be su±cient to induce
search e®ort, yielding a constraint of the form (U(w) ¡ U(b + ¹) ¸ B). A full treatment
would however require a dynamic model, and we cannot provide it here.
3 Shallow pockets
In our benchmark, ¯rms were risk neutral and had deep pockets. These assumptions are
again too strong. Even in the absence of aggregate risk, the owners of many ¯rms, especially
small ones, are not fully diversi¯ed, and thus are likely to act as if they were risk averse.
tives and insurance considerations are present, there is typically a need for a \budget breaker", such as an
insurance company or the state.
7Under the more general assumption that shirking does not yield zero productivity but instead shifts
the distribution of y from G(¢) to H(¢), with G(¢) stochastically dominating H(¢), results are less clear cut.
In the absence of further restrictions, it is not necessarily the case that f is greater than ¹.
10And, even if entrepreneurs are risk neutral, information problems in ¯nancial markets are
likely to lead to restrictions on the funds available to ¯rms. In this section, we focus on
the implications of limited funds.
We assume that each entrepreneur starts with assets I + ¹ f, where ¹ f ¸ 0 is therefore
the free cash °ow available to the ¯rm after investment. While it is a convenient starting
point, the exogeneity of ¹ f is obviously too stark, and we discuss a number of extensions
below.
3.1 The optimal allocation
The government budget constraint (7), the threshold condition (3), and the condition that
payments by the ¯rm in case of layo® cannot exceed free cash °ow (f · ¹ f), can be combined
to give the following constraint on ¹ y;w and ¹:8 9
G(¹ y)¹ ¡ (1 ¡ G(¹ y))(¹ y ¡ w) · ¹ f:
Therefore, the optimal allocation is the solution to:
max
fw;¹;¹ yg
VW ´ G(¹ y)U(b + ¹) + (1 ¡ G(¹ y))U(w);
subject to the resource constraint:
V ´ ¡G(¹ y)¹ +
Z 1
¹ y
y dG(y) ¡ (1 ¡ G(¹ y))w = I;
and the additional constraint:
G(¹ y)¹ ¡ (1 ¡ G(¹ y))(¹ y ¡ w) · ¹ f:
8One may wonder whether allowing for job creation subsidies/taxes in addition to payroll and layo® taxes
might alleviate the shallow pocket constraint, and improve the allocation. This is not the case. Subsidies,
even if allowed in the government budget constraint, would not appear in the equation below.
9This constraint is derived as follows. First rewrite the threshold condition as ¿ = ¹ y¡w+f and replace
¿ in the government budget constraint to get ¡G(¹ y)(¹¡f)+(1¡G(¹ y))(¹ y¡w+f) = 0: For a given ¹ y¡w,
the lower f, the lower is ¹. Reorganize and use f · ¹ f to get the equation in the text.
11From the ¯rst-order conditions, it follows that the worker still receives full insurance10:
w¤ = b + ¹¤:
Furthermore, if the second constraint is binding (that is, if ¹ f is less than unemployment
bene¯ts in the optimal allocation derived in Section 1) :
¹ y¤ = b +
(¹¤ ¡ ¹ f)
(1 ¡ G(¹ y¤))
> b: (13)
By limiting payments by ¯rms in case of layo®, the shallow pocket constraint prevents
the state from achieving the production-e±cient threshold, and the layo® rate is now higher
than the production-e±cient level. The tighter the shallow pocket constraint | the lower
¹ f, the larger (¹¤ ¡ ¹ f), the higher ¹ y¤, and so, the larger the layo® rate. The levels of ¹ y¤,
w¤, and ¹¤ are determined by (13), the full insurance condition, and the condition that
the resource constraint holds with equality.
The optimal allocation still o®ers full insurance to workers. But limited funds lead to
a higher threshold productivity, and thus a higher layo® rate than in the benchmark.
3.2 Implementation
If the shallow-pocket constraint is binding, the state chooses the layo® tax f = ¹ f. Given
unemployment bene¯ts ¹¤, the government budget constraint then implies:
¿ =
G(¹ y¤)
1 ¡ G(¹ y¤)
(¹¤ ¡ ¹ f) > 0:
As unemployment bene¯ts exceed layo® taxes, payroll taxes must be positive.
The threshold productivity chosen by ¯rms is therefore given by:
¹ y¤ = b + ¹¤ + ¿ ¡ f = b + ¹¤ +
G(¹ y¤)
1 ¡ G(¹ y¤)
(¹¤ ¡ ¹ f) ¡ ¹ f = b +
(¹¤ ¡ f)
1 ¡ G(¹ y¤)
:
10To see why the presence of shallow pockets does not prevent full insurance, consider an allocation where
w > b + ¹. Now, consider a decrease in the wage of ¢w < 0 and an equal increase in payments by ¯rms
to the state. This change a®ects neither the threshold condition nor the ¯rm's pro¯t. Use these increased
payments to increase unemployment bene¯ts by ¡[(1 ¡ G(¹ y))=G(¹ y)]¢w. Together, these changes imply a
change in utility of [¡(1 ¡ G(¹ y))U
0(w) + (1 ¡ G(¹ y))U
0(b + ¹)](¡¢w) > 0. Thus, welfare can be improved
until workers are fully insured.
12This is the same expression as in (13), and so, layo® and payroll taxes indeed implement
the optimal allocation. The derivation shows that we can think of the shallow pocket
constraint as a®ecting the threshold productivity level directly (through the limit on the
layo® tax) and indirectly (through the need for positive payroll taxes); both the lower layo®
tax and the higher payroll tax reduce the ¯scal cost of layo® for ¯rms, and thus lead to a
layo® rate higher than the production-e±cient level.
By the same argument as before, the resource constraint implies that workers receive
the optimal w¤ and ¹¤.
We summarize the results in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. In the presence of shallow pockets, workers remain fully insured (w¤ =
b+¹¤). The threshold productivity is higher than the wage equivalent of being unemployed
(¹ y > b), leading to a higher layo® rate than in the benchmark.
This allocation can be implemented by the government choosing unemployment bene¯ts
¹¤, and ¯nancing them partly through layo® taxes ¹ f, and partly through payroll taxes,
¿ > 0. Put another way, the implementation implies now a contribution rate smaller than
one.
As before, implementation can be achieved by a pooling agency, receiving contributions
¹ fG(¹ y¤) from ¯rms that layo® and contributions ¿(1 ¡ G(¹ y¤) from those that do not, and
paying unemployment bene¯ts G(¹ y¤)¹¤ to laid{o® workers. Firms have an incentive to
join, and the agency may therefore be private.
3.3 Discussion
Two extensions of this analysis of shallow pockets are explored more formally in a com-
panion paper (Blanchard-Tirole 2005). Here is a short summary of the conclusions of that
paper:
(a) Endogenization of limited pocket-depth. There are at least two reasons why ¯rms have
shallow pockets. The ¯rst reason is that they may not want to have deep pockets even if
they can. This arises when, in contrast to the maintained assumption of this paper, the
government policy is set after rather than before ¯rms invest. Suppose, for example, that
the state cannot commit and sets (¿;f;¹) after ¯rms have invested and hired workers, but
before they learn the productivity of the match. In this case, ¯rms will obviously choose to
be \judgment proof", i.e. to have no assets left in case of layo®, so ¹ f = 0. The threshold is
13then given by: ¹ y¤ = b + ¹¤=(1 ¡ G(¹ y¤). The high threshold, and by implication, the high
layo® rate, re°ects two distortions, one coming from zero layo® taxes and the other from
positive payroll taxes.
Second, ¯rms may have limited access to external ¯nance due to a dearth of pledgeable
income. When the entrepreneurs enjoy a rent R > 0 in case of continuation, investors
cannot appropriate the full surplus from continuation, which leads to more layo®s than
in the benchmark. We ¯nd however that, in this case, the state should still make the
\investor-entrepreneur coalition" fully accountable for the cost of layo®s, so the optimal
contribution rate remains equal to one.
(b) Multi-activity ¯rms. A concern often expressed by policy makers is that, even if the
¯rm can pay the layo® taxes, it may have to close otherwise healthy activities. The
companion paper, in a two-activity context, investigates the possibility and implication
of such \spillovers" or \snowball" e®ects. It shows that the state in general does not want
to collect the fully collectable amount (f in the notation of this section) in case of partial
layo®s. If it did collect the full amount, the marginal layo® tax on further layo®s would
be equal to zero (as the state cannot collect more than f.) This would in turn provide
excessive incentives for the ¯rm to shut down entirely when having low productivity only
in one activity.
4 Ex-post wage bargaining
Our benchmark embodied the assumption that wages were set ex-ante, i.e. at the time of
hiring. This had the implication that, by o®ering unemployment insurance to risk averse
workers, a ¯rm could not only o®er a lower wage, but actually lower its expected labor
costs.
To some extent however, there is always some room for ex-post bargaining. When this is
the case, a ¯rm which has to pay a layo® tax if it lays a worker o® is in a weaker bargaining
position vis-¶ a-vis that worker; a worker who will receive unemployment bene¯ts if laid
o® is in a stronger position. The layo® tax, the severance payments, and the provision
of unemployment bene¯ts both lead to higher, not lower, wages, and thus increase labor
costs.
In this section, we therefore modify our earlier assumption about wage setting, assume
ex-post wage bargaining instead, and characterize the optimal allocation and its imple-
14mentation under ex-post wage bargaining. In order to avoid the complexities attached
to bargaining under incomplete information, we assume, in this section only, that both
the ¯rm and the worker observe productivity ex post. Thus \ex-post wage bargaining"
includes the assumption of symmetric information between worker and ¯rm ex post.
4.1 A formalization of wage bargaining
The following formalization captures the e®ects of bene¯ts and taxes on ex-post wage
determination in a simple way:
Assume wage setting now takes place after productivity is realized, and is the outcome
of a two-stage game. In stage 1, the worker makes a wage o®er to the ¯rm. The ¯rm can
either accept the o®er or turn it down. If it turns it down, the wage is set in stage 2, either
by the worker with probability ¯, or by the ¯rm with probability 1 ¡ ¯.
Under the assumption that the ¯rm chooses the threshold level of productivity so as
to maximize pro¯t ex-post, in stage 2, the highest wage the ¯rm will accept, and therefore
the wage o®ered by the worker, is equal to y ¡ ¿ + f. The lowest wage the worker will
accept, and therefore the wage o®ered by the ¯rm, is equal to b + ¹. Thus, the expected
wage in stage 2 is given by ¯(y ¡¿ +f)+(1¡¯)(b+¹). This implies that, in stage 1, the
worker will make the highest o®er acceptable by the (risk neutral) ¯rm, i.e. an o®er of
w(y) = ¯(y ¡ ¿ + f) + (1 ¡ ¯)(b + ¹):
The higher the layo® tax, or the lower the payroll tax, or the higher the unemployment
bene¯ts, the higher is the wage.
The threshold value for productivity, ¹ y, is given by the condition that w(¹ y)+¿ ¡¹ y = f.
Using the expression for the wage and rearranging:
¹ y = b + ¹ + ¿ ¡ f: (14)
Note that the threshold is privately e±cient. Just as in the benchmark, the combination
of f = ¹; ¿ = 0 would deliver the production-e±cient threshold, ¹ y = b. But, as we shall
see, other considerations are now relevant.
Expression (14) allows us to rewrite the wage schedule as:
w(y) = (b + ¹) + ¯(y ¡ ¹ y): (15)
15The wage paid to the marginal worker, the worker in a job with productivity equal to
the threshold level, is equal to (b + ¹), the wage equivalent of being unemployed plus
unemployment bene¯ts and severance payments. The wage then increases with ¯ times
the di®erence between productivity and threshold productivity.
4.2 The optimal allocation
The optimal allocation solves the same problem as in the benchmark, subject to the ad-












(y ¡ w(y)) dG(y) = I;
and the wage relation
w(y) = b + ¹ + ¯(y ¡ ¹ y):
Under pure ex-post wage bargaining, the scope for unemployment bene¯ts to provide in-
surance to workers is extremely limited: An increase in unemployment bene¯ts does not
change the slope of the income schedule, increasing all wages by an amount equal to un-
employment bene¯ts. Put di®erently, the only degree of freedom is the location of the kink
¹ y in the worker's income schedule. The solution can be characterized as follows:
The threshold level of productivity is implicitly de¯ned by:
¹ y¤ = b +








where E[U0jy ¸ ¹ y] ´ (
R 1
¹ y¤ U0(w(y))dG(y))=(1 ¡ G(¹ y¤)) is the expected value of marginal
utility if employed, and E U0 ´ G(¹ y¤)U0(b + ¹) +
R 1
¹ y¤ U0(w(y)) dG(y) is the unconditional
expected value of marginal utility.
So long as ¯ is strictly positive, and workers strictly risk averse, then the expected
marginal utility if employed is less than the unconditional expected marginal utility, and
so ¹ y¤ is greater than b. The layo® rate exceeds the production-e±cient level. Setting ¹ y¤ = b
16(and f = ¹) would achieve production e±ciency. Our formalization shows that it is optimal
to choose a threshold higher than the production-e±cient level so as to decrease income
uncertainty. The more risk averse the workers, or the stronger the workers in bargaining,
the higher the threshold level, and so the higher the layo® rate.11
Given ¹ y, ¹ and by implication the wage schedule w(y) are determined by the resource
constraint above.
4.3 Implementation through payroll and layo® taxes
Replacing ¹ y from (16) in the expression for the threshold decision of ¯rms, (14), gives the
¯rst relation between f and ¿:
f ¡ ¿ = ¹ ¡ ¯








The other relation is given, as before, by the budget constraint, equation (7). As the
second term on the right side of equation (17) is now negative, f ¡ ¿ < ¹. Together with
the government budget constraint, this implies f < ¹ and so, a contribution rate below
one. The reason is clear from above: The optimal threshold is higher than the production-
e±cient level. This is achieved by lowering the contribution rate from its benchmark value,
namely unity. By implication, payroll taxes must be positive, in order to ¯nance the
shortfall of the unemployment insurance system.
11One way of getting more intuition for the optimal threshold is to combine the ¯rst and the second
constraints, and reorganize to read:
G(¹ y)(b + ¹) +
Z 1
¹ y
((b + ¹) + ¯(y ¡ ¹ y)) dG(y) · G(¹ y)b +
Z 1
¹ y
y dG(y) ¡ I:
The left side gives the value of total workers' income (the sum of wages, reservation wages, and bene¯ts)
in the economy. The right side gives the value of total income in the economy. The two are the same, as
free entry implies zero pro¯t income.
Suppose, counterfactually, that changes in ¹ y do not a®ect total income, and so do not a®ect total workers'
income. Then, changes in ¹ y change the shape of the income pro¯le without a®ecting the total workers'
income. An increase in ¹ y implies that more workers receive (¹ + b). The overall workers' income remains
the same, but the income schedule is °atter. Indeed, the best value of ¹ y from the point of insurance is
¹ y = 1, where all workers receive the same income.
The assumption that changes in ¹ y do not a®ect total income is, however, clearly incorrect. Starting from
¹ y = b, small changes in ¹ y do not a®ect total income; this implies that, as it decreases risk, at least a small
increase in ¹ y is desirable; this explains why the optimal ¹ y exceeds b. But, as ¹ y increases, the output loss
increases, and total income decreases. For ¹ y = 1 for example, total income is just b and so ¹ must be equal
to zero. This implies that the optimal value of ¹ y is greater than b, but less than one.
17Note that for ¯ = 0, i.e. if workers have no bargaining power, then we obtain the same
characterization as in the benchmark: f = ¹ and ¹ = w ¡ b. As ¯ becomes positive, and








That is, both the unemployment bene¯t and the layo® tax decrease as the workers acquire
more bargaining power, and the layo® tax falls faster, leading to a decreasing contribution
rate.
We summarize our results as follows:
Proposition 4. When wages are set through ex{post bargaining, utility for the marginal
worker is the same as for the unemployed workers, and workers with higher productivity
receive a higher wage. These outcomes are independent of the state's policy choices. It
is optimal to induce a threshold higher than the production-e±cient level: (¹ y¤ > b). This
choice decreases the uncertainty faced by workers at some cost in e±ciency.
This optimal allocation can in turn be implemented through a combination of layo®
taxes, payroll taxes, and unemployment bene¯ts. Layo® taxes must be less than unem-
ployment bene¯ts, with payroll taxes used to make up the di®erence; equivalently, the
contribution rate must be less than one.
5 Heterogeneity
We have assumed so far that all workers and all ¯rms were ex-ante identical. In reality, they
clearly are not. Firms di®er in the distribution of productivity shocks (or, more generally,
the distribution of productivity and relative demand shocks) they face, and in their initial
assets. Workers also di®er in the distribution of productivity. We study in this section
the implications of heterogeneity in productivity, both on the ¯rm and on the worker side,
both observed and unobserved.
5.1 Heterogeneity of ¯rms
A worry often expressed by policy makers is that, if some ¯rms have higher layo® rates
than others, a layo® tax will penalize them more, and this may be undesirable.
18To explore this idea, suppose there are two types of ¯rms, \strong" and \weak", which
di®er in their productivity distributions. The productivity of \strong ¯rms" is drawn from
cumulative distribution GH(¢) and that of \weak ¯rms" from distribution GL(¢).12 The
distribution function of strong ¯rms stochastically dominates that of weak ¯rms: for all y
in (0;1), GH(y) < GL(y). The fraction of strong ¯rms is equal to ½.
Let us start with the assumption that this heterogeneity is unobserved, so the state is
unable to tell the two types of ¯rms apart. Let us also start with the assumption that the
state sets a uniform policy (¿;f;¹). We return to these two assumptions below.
Note that given the distribution assumptions and uniform taxation, strong ¯rms have
higher expected pro¯ts than weak ¯rms. We assume that the number of strong ¯rms is
¯xed. Thus, at the creation margin, the free entry condition is relevant for weak ¯rms only.
By contrast, both types may lay workers o®, so the destruction margin is relevant for both
types of ¯rms.
The fact that the free entry condition is relevant only for weak ¯rms makes it more
di±cult to follow the optimal allocation/implementation approach we have followed until
now. We take instead the more \pedestrian" route of solving the optimization problem of
the state given ¯rms' behavior.
We assume that the state maximizes the welfare of workers. Allowing the state to also
put some weight on the positive rents earned by the owners of strong ¯rms would not alter
the results. The state's optimization problem is given by:
max
f¿;f;¹;w;¹ yg
[½GH(¹ y) + (1 ¡ ½)GL(¹ y)] U(b + ¹)
+ [½(1 ¡ GH(¹ y)) + (1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ GL(¹ y))] U(w);




(y ¡ w ¡ ¿)dGL(y) = I;
the government budget constraint
¡[½GH(¹ y) + (1 ¡ ½)GL(¹ y)] (¹ ¡ f)
+[½(1 ¡ GH(¹ y)) + (1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ GL(¹ y))] ¿ = 0;
12We assume that the weak ¯rms are not too unproductive. Namely we assume that bGL(b) + R 1
b ydGL(y) ¸ I : Weak ¯rms have positive NPV for the production-e±cient threshold.
19and the threshold productivity condition, which is the same for weak and strong ¯rms:
¹ y = w + ¿ ¡ f:
The solution can then be characterized as follows:
² The state fully insures workers: w = b + ¹.
² The threshold level of productivity is given by:
¹ y = b +
½(GL(¹ y) ¡ GH(¹ y))
(½gH(¹ y) + (1 ¡ ½)gL(¹ y))
:
By the de¯nition of weak and strong ¯rms, GL(¹ y) > GH(¹ y). So, unless ½ = 0, the
threshold level is higher than the e±cient level.
This solution is in turn implemented by choosing layo® taxes lower than unemployment
bene¯ts, so through a contribution rate lower than unity. The di®erence is ¯nanced through
payroll taxes.
The intuition for why the contribution rate is less than one is as follows: Both types of
¯rms may lay workers o® and so the destruction margin applies to all ¯rms. By contrast, the
creation margin corresponds to the weak ¯rms only. The state can then improve workers'
welfare by allowing for some cross-subsidy from strong to weak ¯rms|transferring some of
the rents of strong ¯rms to wages. Because the state is unable to assess the ¯rms' strength,
the cross-subsidy operates through the contribution rate: Weak ¯rms lay workers o® more
than strong ¯rms and so bene¯t more from a contribution rate smaller than unity.
Can the state do better by o®ering menus and letting ¯rms self select? Appendix 1
shows that while o®ering a menu improves e±ciency, the solution carries the main char-
acteristics of the uniform policy, namely cross-subsidization of weak ¯rms by strong ¯rms,
with a contribution rate for weak ¯rms below one.
If heterogeneity is observable, i.e. if the state is able to tell weak and strong ¯rms
apart, the state can do even better. Characterizing the optimal policy is straightforward:
It is still optimal to subsidize weak ¯rms. This can now be done however by o®ering a
20job creation subsidy to the weak ¯rms, while setting the net contribution rate equal to
1 for both types of ¯rms. This achieves the desired redistribution from strong to weak
¯rms, while avoiding distortions at the destruction margin. (Note that both layo® and
payroll taxes must be higher than in the benchmark, as the extra revenue is needed to
¯nance job creation subsidies to weak ¯rms. The di®erence between the layo® tax and the
payroll tax remains however equal to unemployment bene¯ts, so there is no distortion at
the destruction margin.)
We can summarize our results as follows:
Proposition 5. Suppose that there are two types of ¯rms: \strong" or \weak". Strong
¯rms have productivity distribution GH(¢), weak ¯rms GL(¢), and GL(y) > GH(y) for all
y in (0;1).
If this heterogeneity is unobserved, and if the state relies on a uniform policy, then the
optimal policy is to fully insure workers (w = b + ¹), choose a threshold level higher than
the e±cient level (¹ y > b), and implement it through a contribution rate less than one.
If the state o®ers a menu instead, then the optimal menu separates the ¯rms and has
the following properties: Workers are fully insured. Strong ¯rms face a net contribution
rate of unity, and choose the e±cient threshold. Weak ¯rms face a net contribution rate
below one, and the threshold exceeds the e±cient level. The underlying mechanism remains
the same, cross-subsidization of weak ¯rms through the use of a lower contribution rate.
Whether the state o®ers menus or not, it is optimal, if the proportion of weak ¯rms is
small enough, to not have them operate at all|at the cost of some ex-ante unemployment|
and to set a unit contribution rate.
If heterogeneity is observed by the state, then the optimal policy is to o®er a job creation
subsidy to weak ¯rms, choose the e±cient threshold for productivity, and implement it
through a unit net contribution rate for both types of ¯rms.
5.2 Heterogeneity of workers
Another frequently expressed worry is that some workers are more likely to be laid-o® than
others, and that a layo® tax may make ¯rms more reluctant to hire them, and thus make
these workers worse o®.
To explore this idea, we set up a case very similar to that of ¯rms. We assume there
are two types of workers, \high-ability" and \low-ability" workers. High-ability workers
21have a productivity distribution given by GH(:), low-ability workers a distribution given by
GL(¢), with GL(y) > GH(y) for all y in (0;1).13 The fraction of workers with high ability
is equal to ½.
We assume that ¯rms know the workers' abilities. Proceeding in parallel with the earlier
case of heterogeneity in ¯rms, we start by assuming both that the state does not know the
workers' abilities, and that it chooses a uniform policy (¿;f;¹).
We can simplify the set-up of the optimization problem, by noting that workers of each
type will be fully insured, and that, because high-ability workers are more valuable to
¯rms, they will be paid more, both when employed and when unemployed.
Suppose therefore that low-ability workers receive w when employed, and ¹ when un-
employed, and are fully insured, so w = b+¹. High-ability workers will then receive w+¢
when employed, and ¹ + ¢ when unemployed (so w + ¢ = b + ¹ + ¢), where ¢ is the
additional expected pro¯t brought about to the ¯rm by a high-ability worker. Noting that
¢ does not a®ect the layo® decision, so the threshold productivity is the same for both
types of workers, it follows that ¢ is given by:
¢ = [GL (¹ y) ¡ GH (¹ y)]f +
Z 1
¹ y
[y ¡ (b + ¹) ¡ ¿][dGH (y) ¡ dGL (y)]:
Payment of ¢ can be achieved by wage-indexed unemployment bene¯ts, so a worker
who is paid w + ¢ receives ¹ + ¢ (and the ¯rm pays correspondingly higher layo® taxes
when laying a high-ability worker o®).
With this characterization of wage setting, and assuming that the state maximizes a
utilitarian social welfare function, the optimal policy is the solution to:
max
f¿;f;¹;¹ yg
f(1 ¡ ½)U (b + ¹) + ½ U (b + ¹ + ¢)g;
subject to the free entry condition
¡GL (¹ y)f +
Z 1
¹ y
[y ¡ (b + ¹) ¡ ¿]dGL (y) = I;
13We assume that the low productivity workers are not too unproductive. Namely we assume that
bGL(b)+
R 1
b ydGL(y) ¸ I: Under observed heterogeneity, the low-ability workers are su±ciently productive
to justify investment by ¯rms.
22and the government budget constraint
[(1 ¡ ½)GL (¹ y) + ½GH (¹ y)](f ¡ ¹) + [(1 ¡ ½)[1 ¡ GL (¹ y)] + ½[1 ¡ GH (¹ y)]]¿ = 0;
where ¢ and ¹ y have been de¯ned above.
The solution has the following form:
² If the proportion of low-ability workers is high enough, then the threshold for productivity
is given by:
¹ y = b +
½(1 ¡ ½)[GL(¹ y) ¡ GH(¹ y)] [U0(¹ + b) ¡ U0(¹ + b + ¢)]
[(1 ¡ ½)gL(¹ y) + ½gH(¹ y)] [(1 ¡ ½)U0(¹ + b) + ½U0(¹ + b + ¢)]
:
Note that GL(¹ y) ¡ GH(¹ y) is positive, and so is U0(¹ + b) ¡ U0(¹ + b + ¢). So the fraction
on the right is positive, and the optimal threshold is higher than the e±cient level.
This solution is in turn implemented by using a contribution rate below unity, with the
rest of unemployment bene¯ts being ¯nanced by payroll taxes.
² If the fraction of low-ability workers is small enough, however, then it is not optimal to
facilitate their employability. No job is created for them, and they receive unemployment
bene¯ts ¹ for sure. In this case, threshold productivity is given by:
¹ y = b:
This solution is implemented by relying on a gross contribution rate greater than one:
f=¹ > 1; and a net contribution rate equal to one: f ¡ ¿ = ¹. The payroll tax rate is in
turn given by ¿ = [(1 ¡ ½)=½] ¹.
The intuition for these results is as follows. When both types of workers are employed,
the use of a contribution rate below one reduces the cost to ¯rms of hiring a low-ability
worker. This in turn leads to a higher relative wage for low-ability workers, and therefore
reduces inequality, but at some cost in e±ciency. If the proportion of low-ability workers
is very low, it is more e±cient to have them not work, and then to choose tax rates so as
to have e±cient separations for high-ability workers.
Because unemployment bene¯ts for low-ability workers exceed corresponding layo®
taxes, the solution requires having both a positive payroll tax and a correspondingly higher
23layo® tax on high-ability workers. This increases revenues while maintaining a net contri-
bution rate equal to one.14
Note that the logic of the results under ¯rm and worker heterogeneity is similar: Weak
workers (¯rms) are more likely to be laid o® (to lay o®), and an incomplete internalization
of the externality of the layo® on the UI fund bene¯ts the creation margin.
What if the state can o®er menus and ¯rms then self-select? It is straightforward to
show that the state then o®ers two options, one aimed at ¯rms that announce they have
hired a high-ability worker, one aimed at ¯rms that announce they have hired a low-ability
worker. The ¯rst option has a net contribution rate equal to one. The second option has
a net contribution rate below one. Both types of workers are fully insured. Thus, just
as in the uniform case, heterogeneity leads to lower layo® taxes, but in this case only for
low-ability workers.
What happens if di®erences between workers are observable? When the state can
tell apart high-ability from low-ability workers|for example if workers are in bad health
or disabled|then the optimal policy is to o®er a job creation subsidy (or, equivalently,
uniformly lower payroll and layo® taxes) to ¯rms if they hire a low-ability worker. The net
contribution rate can then be set equal to one for both types, and the destruction margin
is undistorted for both types. In general, when di®erences are only partly observable, the
solution combines job creation subsidies and a net contribution rate below one.
We summarize our results in the following proposition:
Proposition 6. Suppose that there are two types of workers: \high-ability" and \low-
ability". High-ability workers have productivity distribution GH(¢), low-ability workers
GL(¢), and GL(y) > GH(y) for all y in (0;1).
If this heterogeneity is unobserved and the state relies on a uniform policy, then the
optimal policy is to fully insure workers (w = b + ¹), choose a threshold level higher than
the e±cient level (¹ y > b), and implement it through a contribution rate less than one.
The lower layo® tax leads in e®ect to a transfer from high-ability workers to low-ability
workers.
If the state o®ers a menu instead, then the optimal menu separates workers and has
the following properties: Workers are fully insured. Firms hiring high-ability workers face
14This result is related to the result in Cahuc and Jolivet (2003) where the need to ¯nance a public good
also leads to higher layo® and payroll tax rates.
24a net contribution rate of unity, and choose the e±cient threshold. Firms hiring low-ability
workers face a net contribution rate below one, and the threshold exceeds the e±cient level.
The underlying mechanism remains the same, cross-subsidization of low-ability workers
through the use of a lower contribution rate.
Whether or not the state is allowed to use menus, it is optimal, if the proportion of
low-ability workers is small enough, to leave them unemployed, and use a unit contribution
rate for the remaining, high-ability workers.
If heterogeneity is observed by the state, then the optimal policy is to o®er a job
creation subsidy to low-ability workers, and choose an e±cient threshold for productivity,
and implement it through a unit contribution rate.
6 Mixing unemployment bene¯ts and severance pay
We have assumed throughout that the state was the sole provider of insurance to workers.
We saw how, even under this assumption, the state was able to implement the optimal al-
location. This assumption however raises two issues relative to the scope for private-sector
provision of insurance. The ¯rst is whether a private third-party insurer can substitute
for the state. As we have seen, the answer is yes as long as redistributive concerns, across
¯rms or across workers, are absent, i.e. except in section 5. The second issue is whether
the third party insurer, whether the state or a private insurance company, needs to de-
mand exclusivity and prohibit the ¯rm from o®ering supplemental insurance in the form
of severance pay.
A recurrent theme of the insurance literature is that the insurer must be wary of the
externality imposed by supplemental insurance contracts (Pauly (1974)). For this reason,
insurance companies often demand exclusivity and managerial compensation contracts pre-
vent executives from undoing their incentives through insider trading or derivatives con-
tracts with ¯nancial institutions. In the context of this paper, the state's provision of
insurance to workers raises the question of welfare-reducing supplemental insurance.
Let us ¯rst note that allowing severance pay does not reduce (nor, of course, does
it increase) welfare when the state already provides full insurance to workers. Intuition
suggests, and analysis con¯rms, that the ¯rm does not want to undo the full insurance pro-
vided by the state by overinsuring the worker (severance pay) or underinsuring her (asking
the worker to return some of the unemployment bene¯ts, assuming this were feasible).
Thus, the analysis of Sections 1 (benchmark), 3 (shallow pockets) and 5 (¯rm or worker
25heterogeneity) is immune to the introduction of severance pay.
The co-insurance problem may therefore arise only when the worker is imperfectly
insured, that is in Sections 2 (incomplete insurance) and 4 (ex post wage bargaining). In
Section 4, though, the ¯rm is unable to exchange a bit more insurance against a lower
wage. Indeed, severance pay increases the wage one-for-one; if ¹F denotes the severance
pay, the new wage function, b w(y), can be written as:
b w(y) = ¯ (y ¡ ¿ + f + ¹F) + (1 ¡ ¯)(b + ¹ + ¹F)
= w(y) + ¹F:
The threshold value for productivity, y, is given by the condition that b w(y) + ¿ ¡ y =
f + ¹F; that is, the threshold
y = b + ¹ + ¿ ¡ f
is independent of severance pay. Put di®erently, the introduction of severance pay exerts
no externality on the state (as it doesn't change y) and only serves to increase labor costs.
Thus, the analysis of Section 4 is also immune to the introduction of severance pay.
The only case in which co-insurance reduces welfare and exclusivity is therefore optimal
is that of incomplete insurance (Section 2). To see this, return to stage 2 and allow ¯rms
to o®er, as in the benchmark, contracts which specify both a wage w and a severance
payment, ¹F. The expected utility of workers is given by:
VW ´ G(¹ y)(U(b + ¹F + ¹) ¡ B) + (1 ¡ G(¹ y))U(w);
And the free entry condition is given by:
VF ´ ¡G(¹ y)(f + ¹F) +
Z 1
¹ y
y dG(y) ¡ (1 ¡ G(¹ y))(w + ¿) = I:
Now, starting from ¹F = 0, and assuming the economy is at the optimal allocation, so




1 ¡ G(¹ y)
Bd¹F > 0:
Firms therefore have an incentive to o®er more insurance than required in the optimal
allocation. The reason why is that increasing ¹F has two e®ects on the expected utility of
26workers. First, it creates a wedge between marginal utility when employed and unemployed;
starting from the optimal allocation, this e®ect is of second order. The other is that it
reduces the probability of a layo®; because the loss in utility from becoming unemployed
is equal to U(w) ¡ U(b + ¹) + B = B, this e®ect is of ¯rst order and dominates the ¯rst.
When ¯rms increase ¹F however, they decrease layo®s, and given that layo® taxes exceed
unemployment bene¯ts paid by the state, they impose a negative externality on the state.
This is why, in the end, letting ¯rms freely choose severance payments leads to a suboptimal
allocation.
Proposition 7. In the incomplete insurance extension of Section 2, allowing the ¯rm to
pay severance payments in addition to the unemployment bene¯ts paid by the state leads to
oversinsurance, an unemployment insurance de¯cit and suboptimal welfare. By contrast,
severance pay has no impact on welfare in the benchmark and in the other extensions.
7 Extensions and Conclusions
We are very much aware however of the limits of our analysis. Even within our one-period
model, there are a number of issues still to be explored. Let us mention two.
An important issue not taken up here is that of quits versus layo®s. If we think of layo®s
as triggered by productivity shocks (shocks to y), and quits as triggered by reservation wage
shocks (shocks to b, or to the disutility of work|which we do not have explicitly in our
model), and we think of the layo® tax as applying only in case of layo®s, this raises two
sets of issues. The ¯rst is actions by ¯rms to induce workers they would like to lay o® to
quit instead (harassment), and actions by workers to induce ¯rms they would like to quit
to lay them o® instead (shirking). The second is actions by ¯rms and workers together
to mislabel quits and layo®s. The incentives to harass, shirk, or cooperatively misreport,
depend very much in each case on the contribution rate. We have informally explored these
issues in Blanchard and Tirole (2003b), but a formal treatment remains to be given.
Another issue is the role of judges, who, in many European countries, play a central role,
and are often ultimately in charge of deciding whether layo®s are justi¯ed or not. Clearly,
the logic of our argument is that this is better accomplished through a combination of layo®
taxes and severance payments, with the decision then being left to the ¯rm. But our look at
the implications of imperfections, from shallow pockets to heterogeneity, also suggests the
27desirability of adapting layo® taxes to particular situations. This can in principle be done
through o®ering menus, or allowing taxes to be conditional on observable characteristics
of ¯rms, or by leaving some discretion to judges. It remains to be shown however if and
when judges do in fact have the information, the ability, and the incentives, to take better
and more informed decisions.
Then, and obviously so, there are dynamic issues we could not consider at all in our one{
period model. Dynamic models of the labor market with risk aversion and imperfections
are notoriously hard to solve. The only model we know which derives optimal institutions|
de¯ned as the optimal combination of payroll taxes, layo® taxes, job creation subsidies or
taxes, and unemployment bene¯ts|was developed by Mortensen and Pissarides (2003).
However, it assumes risk neutrality and so cannot deal in a convincing way with the
interaction between insurance and e±ciency. (A model by Alvarez and Veracierto [1998]
has risk averse workers, self-insurance as well as state-provided insurance, payroll and layo®
taxes, and severance payments. While it shows (numerically) the e®ects of changes in some
of these instruments, it does not give a characterization of optimal taxes and bene¯ts.) We
see two extensions of our model as essential:
The ¯rst is the role and the implications of self insurance by workers (in terms of the
model here, the role and implications of the endogeneity of b). In this context, an important
question is the role, if any, of mandatory individual unemployment accounts such as are
being considered or introduced in a number of Latin American countries. (Three papers
provide a useful starting point here. All three allow for self-insurance, and look at the
role of state-provided insurance in the presence of other imperfections. In Hansen and
Imrohoroglu (1992), moral hazard in search limits the scope for state-provided insurance.
In Acemoglu and Shimer (1999, 2000), state-provided insurance a®ects search, which in
turn a®ects match quality.)
The second is the role of experience rating systems, such as the US system, as ways
of implementing the collection of layo® taxes. This requires a careful look not only at the
dynamic problem of the ¯rm, but at the exact nature of the ¯nancial constraints that it
faces.
We feel, nevertheless, that as it stands, the paper can be helpful in thinking about
reform about employment protection in Europe (the origin of the paper was indeed a
request to de¯ne the contours of employment protection reform in France; our conclusions
are presented in Blanchard and Tirole [2003a,b]):
28The basic conclusion from the benchmark that unemployment bene¯ts should be ¯-
nanced through layo® taxes is straightforward conceptually. It is however very much at
odds with reality in Europe. All European unemployment insurance systems are ¯nanced
through payroll rather than layo® taxes; other things equal, both lead to too high a layo®
rate.
The lack of layo® taxes is counterbalanced however, in many countries, by heavy judicial
intervention. This suggests that a shift from judicial intervention to higher layo® taxes on
¯rms may be desirable, reducing uncertainty and channeling layo® costs into unemployment
bene¯ts.
The basic conclusion from considering limits to insurance|that in the presence of limits
to insurance, higher layo® taxes and a contribution rate larger than one are justi¯ed|is
also very relevant. Employment protection is then a partial substitute for insurance, but
this comes at the cost of production e±ciency. This suggests the importance of reforms of
unemployment insurance which allow for better insurance while still providing incentives to
search. Recent reforms, which make unemployment bene¯ts more explicitly conditional on
search and acceptance of jobs if available, go in that direction. If successful, they can bring
not only better insurance, but also lower employment protection and lower production
ine±ciencies.
The ¯nal broad insight is that layo® and payroll tax schedules should be tailored to
the economic environment in which ¯rms operate. Lower layo® taxes and higher payroll
taxes are called for in industries, countries, or periods in which ¯rms have shallow pockets.
Similarly, unobserved ¯rm or worker heterogeneity suggests relying more on payroll taxes,
and less on layo® taxes in the ¯nancing of unemployment bene¯ts.
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31Appendix 1: Policy menus under ¯rm heterogeneity
Suppose the state o®ers an option (¿L;fL) targeted at weak ¯rms and another (¿H;fH)
at strong ¯rms, rather than the single option (¿;f). With obvious notation change (thresh-
olds, payroll and layo® taxes are now indexed by the type of ¯rm), the optimization problem
is identical to the problem above, except that the last constraint,
¹ y ¡ [w + ¿ ¡ f] = 0;
is replaced by the constraints:
¹ yL ¡ [w + ¿L ¡ fL] = 0; ¹ yH ¡ [w + ¿H ¡ fH] = 0;
and the incentive compatibility constraint that the strong ¯rms do not want to masquerade
as weak ones is given by:
¡GH (¹ yH)fH +
Z 1
¹ yH
(y ¡ w ¡ ¿H)dGH(y) ¸ ¡GH (¹ yL)fL +
Z 1
¹ yL
(y ¡ w ¡ ¿L)dGH(y):
It is useful at this point to de¯ne the net contribution rate as the ratio of the layo® tax
minus the payroll tax to unemployment bene¯ts, (fi ¡¿i)=¹i; i = H;L. Note that, so long
as the net contribution rate is equal to one, the layo® decision is e±cient: What matters
here is not the layo® tax itself, but the di®erence between the layo® tax and the payroll
tax.
The solution can then be characterized as follows:
² The state still fully insures workers: w = b + ¹.
² Strong ¯rms face a net contribution rate equal to one, and so choose the e±cient
threshold:
¹ yH = b and fH ¡ ¿H = ¹:
² Weak ¯rms face a net contribution rate below one, and so choose a threshold higher
than the e±cient level:
¹ yL = b + ½
GL(¹ yL) ¡ GH(¹ yL)
(1 ¡ ½)gL(¹ yL)
and fL ¡ ¿L · ¹:
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